NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 21 | Issue 1

Article 13

3-1-2017

Standing, Statutory Violations, and Concrete Injury
in Federal Consumer Financial Protection Statutes
After Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
John H. Hykes III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John H. Hykes III, Standing, Statutory Violations, and Concrete Injury in Federal Consumer Financial Protection Statutes After Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 21 N.C. Banking Inst. 227 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol21/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Standing, Statutory Violations, and Concrete Injury in
Federal Consumer Financial Protection Statutes After
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, lower-level employees at Wells Fargo have
fraudulently opened more than two million depository and credit card
accounts without consumers’ authorization.1 Cross-selling quotas
required to remain employed at Wells Fargo motivated these
employees.2 Despite a settlement, Wells Fargo still faces legal action
from consumers as well as employees who were fired for refusing to
participate in the fraud.3 This fraud generated $2.6 million in additional
fees that were charged to customers in connection with accounts they
had never intended to open.4 It is difficult to know how these accounts
impacted customers’ credit scores and how damaged credit scores
impacted their financial well-being.5 Federal legislation like the Truth
in Lending Act (“TILA”),6 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),7
and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),8 (collectively,
1. Dan Freed, Heat Rises on Wells Fargo CEO After Lawmaker Grilling, REUTERS
(Sept. 21, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/wells-fargo-accounts-ceoidUSL2N1BX171.
2. Laura J. Keller & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Wells Fargo CEO Takes Beating as
Lawmakers Demand Accountability, 28 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) No. 36. at 1176 (Sept. 22,
2016).
3. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo Settled Over its Bogus Accounts, but it Still Faces
a Fight from Customers and Ex-Employees, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-lawsuits-20160909-snap-story.html.
4. Freed, supra note 1.
5. Keller & Dexheimer, supra note 2, at 1176.
6. Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2015) (noting that,
“economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be
strengthened by the informed use of credit”).
7. Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2015) (“The
banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting.”).
8. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2015)
(“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
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“federal consumer protection statutes”) exist to keep financial
institutions, like Wells Fargo, from abusing their power at the expense
of consumers.9 Consumers10 rely on the civil liability provisions of
federal consumer protection statutes to deter misbehavior by covered
entities,11 as well as to recover against those entities when the behavior
is not deterred.12
FCRA and its civil penalty provision13 were at issue in a 2016
Supreme Court opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.14 FCRA imposes a
duty upon covered entities to follow “reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer information they report.15
While Spokeo specifically addressed an issue in a lawsuit brought under
FCRA, the decision’s impact stretches to other federal consumer
protection statutes.16 To date, Spokeo has not been adjudicated on the
merits.17 While the eventual result could be interesting,18 the relevant
part of the proceedings for this Note is the treatment of Article III
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
9. See, e.g., FCRA § 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (“The banking system is dependent
upon fair and accurate credit reporting.”).
10. See FCRA § 603, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (“The term ‘consumer’ means an
individual.”). “Individual” excludes partnerships, corporations, trusts, estates, governments
and other associations. See FCRA § 603, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) (defining “person” as
including consumers).
11. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 185 (2012)
(“To deny that judicial decisions provide a deterrent effect is to deny the historic role of the
judiciary, not just as a matter of civil justice but as a primary and fundamental source of
behavioral norms.”).
12. See, e.g., FCRA § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (“Any person who willfully fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer
is liable to that consumer . . . .”).
13. Id.
14. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
15. FCRA § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
16. See FDCPA § 813, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by this
section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with
respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”). This excerpt is the civil liability
provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Since Spokeo is about Article III
standing, it potentially impacts every federal statute that contains a civil liability provision
for a bare statutory violation; Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 3(a), 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(1)(B) (2015) (“It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any
person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States . . . to initiate
any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded
voice . . . .”).
17. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“[T]he case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion”).
18. See discussion infra Part V (suggesting that consumer class action lawsuits have a
significant impact on the financial well-being of financial institutions).
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standing19 in Spokeo.20
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo,
critiques the Court’s treatment of Article III standing issues, considers
Spokeo’s impact on financial institutions and consumers, and concludes
by suggesting a new test for standing. This Note proceeds in seven
parts. Part II reviews the general requirements for Article III21 standing
as provided by Supreme Court precedent and explains how Article III
standing differs for intangible harm in statutory violation cases.22 Part
III explores the treatment of Spokeo’s standing issue in each level of the
federal courts.23 Part IV argues that Justice Alito’s majority opinion in
Spokeo poses more questions than it answers and suggests that Justice
Alito incorrectly applied precedent, and, as a result, the majority and
dissenting opinions fail to address the same issues.24 Part V discusses
how Spokeo benefits both financial institutions and consumers.25 Part
VI recommends a new test for Article III standing.26 Part VII concludes
by summarizing the major takeaways from Spokeo.27
II. ARTICLE III STANDING IN THE CONTEXT OF INTANGIBLE HARM
To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing, a
requirement that emerges from the Constitution’s “cases and
controversies” doctrine.28 The irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct, and (3) redressability.29
19. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and
controversies).
20. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1544 (“This case presents the question whether
respondent Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal court . . . .”).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and
controversies).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. See infra Part VII.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to cases and
controversies); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though
some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial selfgovernment, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the caseor-controversy requirement of Article III.”).
29. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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Since the Court in Spokeo only took issue with injury in fact, the latter
two elements will not be discussed further.30
“Injury in fact” is defined as “an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent.”31 Particularization means “it must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way.”32 Concreteness is a far more fleeting
idea.33 In a sense, the injury must be “real.”34 In Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,35 decided in 1992, Justice Scalia rejected a claim of standing
where, in the Court’s view, Congress attempted to convert the public’s
undifferentiated interest, meaning an interest not properly held by any
single person, in the proper administration of law into an individual
right by statute.36 However, even there, it seems that Scalia conflated
particularization and concreteness.37 Scalia seemed more concerned
that violation of the statute creates an injury that is not personal or
distinct in any meaningful way.38
The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish concreteness and
particularization in Federal Election Commission v. Akins in 1998.39 In
Akins, a group of voters filed an administrative complaint with the

30. The second element requires that “the injury . . . be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court.” Id. The third element is that “it must be likely as opposed
to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.
31. Id. The “actual or imminent” part of the “injury in fact” definition is not addressed
by the Supreme Court. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“We
discuss the particularization and concreteness requirements below.”). Likewise, this Note
does not address it.
32. See id. (citing additional cases which use words like “personal” and “distinct” to
describe particularization.
33. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78 (using “concrete” as “real”).
34. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (defining “concrete” as “real”).
35. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
36. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77 (“The question presented here is whether the public
interest in proper administration of the law . . . can be converted into an individual right by a
statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to sue.”).
37. See id. (writing about cases where generalized public grievances are alleged as
individual harm). Throughout this section of the opinion, Scalia wrote about whether the
rights at issue belonged to the public generally or to individuals. See id. This conversation
sounded much more like it related to particularization. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548
(noting that words like “personal” and “distinct” define particularization).
38. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (noting that words like “personal” and distinct”
define particularization).
39. See Fed. Elec. Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (“The kind of judicial
language to which the FEC points . . . invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue is
not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature . . . .”).
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Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) asserting that the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) was required to register as
a political committee.40 Once registered as a political committee, a
group must make certain public disclosures including statements about
its membership and contributions.41 The FEC asserted that the voters
did not have standing to bring such a complaint because the harm was
neither concrete nor particularized.42 The majority opinion described an
abstract—in contradistinction from concrete—injury as one that
effectively results in the Court issuing an advisory opinion.43 Rather
than affirmatively defining concreteness, the Court said that an abstract
injury is like harm to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed,
essentially reiterating the notion that an undifferentiated public interest
cannot give rise to concrete injury.44 However, just because an injury
may be widely shared does not mean it lacks concreteness by necessity;
where an injury is concrete, yet widely shared, courts have found
“injury in fact.”45 In Akins, the Supreme Court found “injury in fact”
where the plaintiffs were unable to access information to which a
federal statute entitled them to have access.46
Concreteness also does not require that the injury be tangible.47
Courts look to Congress for guidance about what sorts of intangible
harms can satisfy the minimum Article III requirements.48 The
Supreme Court acknowledged in Lujan that Congress can elevate to the
status of legally cognizable concrete injuries those intangible injuries

40. Id. at 13–14.
41. See id. at 13 (noting that the Federal Election Campaign Act requires public

disclosures from political committees).
42. See id. at 19 (“The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack standing . . . and
that respondents have not shown that they ‘suffe[r] injury in fact.’”).
43. See id. at 24 (“The abstract nature of the harm . . . prevents a plaintiff from
obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.”).
44. See id. (The abstract nature of the harm—injury to the interest in seeing that the
law is obeyed . . . “).
45. See id. (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the court has found
‘injury in fact.’”).
46. See id. at 21 (“The ‘injury in fact’ that respondents have suffered consists of their
inability to obtain information . . . that . . . the statute requires that AIPAC make public.”).
47. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries
are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”) Justice Alito cites free speech and free
exercise of religion cases as examples of intangible harms that meet the concreteness
requirement. Id.
48. Id.
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which otherwise would be constitutionally inadequate.49 Congress
created such a legally cognizable concrete injury in the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.50 The Court’s opinion in Lujan implicitly asserts that a
violation of a person’s interest in living in a racially integrated
community would not usually meet the injury in fact standard.51
However, Congress elevated the injury so that it satisfied the
concreteness requirement through legislative means.52
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the injury required
by Article III “may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”53 The violation of a
statutorily granted procedural right is sometimes sufficient and a
plaintiff need not allege any additional harm.54 In Akins, the right to
access information, a list of AIPAC donors for instance, was created by
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.55 Congress elevated this
right to the status of a right, “the invasion of which creates standing.”56
In the particular context of “bare” statutory violations, cases like Akins
and Lujan indicate that there is an alternate way to find standing in
federal courts.57
49. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“Both of the cases
used by Linda R.S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress’ elevating to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.”).
50. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2015) (allowing an
aggrieved person to file a complaint within one year of an alleged discriminatory housing
practice); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life. Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 208–12 (1972)).
51. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (implying that injury to a person’s interest in living in a
racially integrated community is the sort of injury that Congress needs to elevate in order for
it to suffice for standing).
52. Id.
53. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
54. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“[T]he violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute
injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”).
55. See Fed. Elec. Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 13 (1998) (“[T]he American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a ‘political committee’ as defined by the Federal
Election Campaign Act . . . and . . . the FEC has refused to required AIPAC to make
disclosures.”).
56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
57. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20 (“Given the language of the statute and the nature of the
injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from
suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit.”); see also
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (noting that the injury required by Article III “may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”).
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III. DOES MR. ROBINS HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE?
The important legal question at issue in Spokeo was whether a
bare statutory violation constituted a concrete injury sufficient to confer
standing.58 The Supreme Court demanded a formal application of the
three-element standing test: (1) Plaintiff must have suffered an “injury
in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”;
(2) there must be a causal relationship between the injury and the
conduct; and (3) it must be more likely than not that the relief will
redress the injury.59 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit suggested there is an
alternative route to Article III standing when a statutory violation is
involved: Congress can confer standing by elevating certain injuries to
legally cognizable injuries, subject to two limitations.60 The plaintiff
must allege her statutory rights, not that the defendant simply violated
the statute, and the statutory right in question must protect against
“individual, rather than collective, harm.”61
Thomas Robins instituted a lawsuit in federal district court in
California alleging that Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) operated its consumer
reporting website in violation of the FCRA.62 FCRA mandates that
credit reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” of consumer reports.63 FCRA also
provides that “any person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any
consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual damages or statutorily
prescribed damages.64 Spokeo owns and operates a website that
publishes information about consumers such as education, marital
status, and information about the individual’s economic condition.65

58. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct.
1540 (2016) (“The violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer
standing.”). But see Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff
must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”).
59. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
60. See Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (“The court identified two constitutional limitations on
congressional power to confer standing.”).
61. Id.
62. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2015).
64. Id. § 1681n(a).
65. Robins, 742 F.3d at 410.
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Robins alleged that Spokeo maintained an inaccurate report about him
on the website, thereby willfully violating the relevant provision of
FCRA.66 Specifically, Robins alleged that the profile contained a
picture purporting to be him, which was not him.67 Robins also alleged
that the profile wrongfully stated that he was in his fifties, married with
children, and employed in a technical or professional field.68 While the
website contained this misinformation, Robins claimed that he was “out
of work,” looking for a job, single, and without children.69 Robins
asserted that this misinformation caused actual harm to his employment
prospects.70
A.

The Central District of California Found Robins Lacked
Standing

FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”71
Robins alleged that Spokeo was in violation of this portion of the statute
in maintaining its website with the inaccurate information.72 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.73 The court
held that Robins failed to allege any injury in fact caused by Spokeo.74
The district court pointed out that “even when asserting a statutory
violation, the plaintiff must allege ‘the Article III minima of injury-infact.’”75 In this case, Robins claimed that he had been “unsuccessful in

66. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Spokeo, Inc. 136 S.
Ct. at 1546 (“Robins filed a class-action complaint . . . claiming . . . that Spokeo willfully
failed to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated above.”).
67. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Id. Additionally, the profile claimed that his economic health was very good and
that his income was in the top 10%. Mr. Robins alleged that this is not true. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. In his brief, Robins suggests that “Spokeo’s report made him appear
overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers
would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities.” Id.
71. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 607, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2015).
72. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW, 2011 WL 597867, at *2 (C.D.
Cal., Jan. 27, 2011), vacated, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id.
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seeking employment.”76 Additionally, he alleged that he was concerned
about future harms; he was concerned that the inaccurate reporting
“[would] affect his ability to obtain credit [and/or] employment.”77
Finding that Robins lacked standing, the court dismissed his case for
want of subject matter jurisdiction and Robins appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.78
B.

The Ninth Circuit Found Article III Standing

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, upon wading
into this complex legal doctrine regarding standing,79 reversed the ruling
of the district court.80 The court held that “[w]hen . . . the statutory
cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can
suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual
damages.”81 FCRA’s civil penalty provision attaches liability to a party
who violates the statute without referencing any kind of harm to a
victim.82 Regardless of whether any actual damages are claimed, there
is an alternative clause for damages of a statutory variety.83 The circuit
Id.
Id. It is possible that the district court is conflating injury in fact with the causation
element of standing. See id. (“Plaintiff only expresses that he has been unsuccessful in
seeking employment.”). If the inaccurate consumer information is causing Robins not to be
able to obtain a job that he otherwise would be able to get, that seems like injury in fact. See
id. (implicitly acknowledging that a present as opposed to future claim of harm to
employment prospects would be sufficient injury in fact). So, although Robins is also
worried about possible, continuing future harm, he does allege a present, rather than
speculative injury. See id. (alleging that his job prospects are currently negatively impacted
by Spokeo’s mistakes).
78. Id. (“Because Plaintiff does not have standing to bring his claims before this
court . . . this case is hereby dismissed . . . .”); see Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410
(9th. Cir. 2014) (appealing on standing), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
79. Robins, 742 F.3d at 411. After the initial finding of no standing, Robins submitted
an amended complaint. Id. The district court then decided that the amended complaint
sufficiently plead injury in fact. Id. When Spokeo moved to certify an interlocutory appeal,
the court reversed its order finding standing on the amended complaint. Id. This flipflopping is evidence of the fleeting nature of the standing requirements, particularly injury
in fact.
80. See id. at 414 (holding that Mr. Robins adequately alleges Article III standing).
81. Id. at 411.
82. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2015) (“Any
person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter
with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any
actual damages . . . or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.”).
83. See id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that
76.
77.
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court then drew on Lujan,84 pointing out that Congress can elevate
“concrete, de facto” injuries to legally cognizable injuries.85 The
question becomes: are violations of statutory rights created by FCRA
injuries that Congress can elevate?86
Other circuits have weighed in on whether the violation of
statutory rights under FCRA are intangible injuries that Congress can
elevate to an injury in fact. The Sixth Circuit addressed whether FCRA
statutory violations are injuries Congress can elevate in 200987 and the
Seventh Circuit addressed it in 2006.88 In Beaudry v. TeleCheck
Services, Inc.,89 the Sixth Circuit offered two constitutional limitations
on congressional power to create standing: (1) a plaintiff must be
“among the injured” and (2) “the statutory right . . . must protect against
individual . . . harm.”90 In Beaudry, Cheryl Beaudry sued TeleCheck
Services (“TeleCheck”), a corporation that provides check verification
services, under the civil liability provision of the FCRA.91 Beaudry
claimed that TeleCheck did not account for a change in Tennessee
driver’s licenses, which resulted in the incorrect reporting that Beaudry
was a first-time check writer.92 Over TeleCheck’s insistence that
Beaudry needed to allege more injury than a plain statutory violation,93
consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any actual damages . . . or damages of not less
than $100 and not more than $1,000.”).
84. See discussion infra Part II.
85. Robins, 742 F.3d at 413.
86. Id.
87. See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the FCRA allows for recovery when there are no measurable damages).
88. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“That actual
loss is small and hard to quantify is why statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act
provide for modest damages without proof of injury.”).
89. 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009).
90. Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (citing Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 707). In Beaudry, the
plaintiff, also under the FCRA, alleged that she was one of the people about whom the false
reports were generated and thus met the first requirement. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 704. “She
thus has alleged that the defendants’ failure to follow ‘reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy’ of credit reporting information occurred ‘with respect to her’
as the statute requires.” Id. The Sixth Circuit then found that FCRA clears the second
constitutional hurdle as well. FCRA “creates an individual right not to have unlawful
practices occur ‘with respect to’ one’s own credit information. Id.
91. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 703; see Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)
(2015) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposes under this
subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer . . . .”).
92. See Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 703 (stating that TeleCheck failed to account for a change
in the way Tennessee licenses are numbered).
93. See id. at 705 (“The defendants, however, insist that the statute requires something
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the Sixth Circuit found that when actual damages are an alternative
form of recovery, there is an implication that a statutory violation alone
is sufficient to establish liability.94
Regarding the two-prong analysis, Beaudry alleged that she was
among the injured.95 Therefore, she claimed that TeleCheck failed to
follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”
regarding her information.96 The Sixth Circuit held that FCRA’s
statutory damages provision aims to protect against individual, rather
than collective, harm.97 When the plaintiff is “among the injured” and
the statutory right protects against individual harm, the “nexus . . .
sustain[s] this statutorily created right.98
In contrast to the relatively substantial treatment given to this
question by the Beaudry court, the Seventh Circuit considered it settled
that a claim for statutory damages was sufficient for standing.99 In
Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.,100 Nancy Murray, the plaintiff
representing a potential class of more than one million, sued a mortgage
company for allegedly violating two FCRA provisions without causing
her any additional harm.101 The Seventh Circuit noted that requiring
more—that Beaudry allege a different form of injury . . . .”).
94. See id. at 705–06 (“Because ‘actual damages’ represent an alternative form of
relief and because the statute permits a recovery when there are no identifiable or
measurable actual damages, this subsection implies that a claimant need not suffer (or
allege) consequential damages to file a claim.”) (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 707 (“Beaudry alleged that she was one of the consumers about whom
the defendants were generating credit card reports based on inaccurate information due to
their failure to update their databases. . . .”).
96. Id.
97. See id. (“[I]t creates an individual right not to have unlawful practices occur ‘with
respect to’ one’s own credit information.”).
98. Id. at 704.
99. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952–53 (7th Cir. 2006)
(disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs should have sought
compensatory damages instead of the FCRA’s statutory damages remedy).
100. 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006).
101. See id. at 950–51 (“Murray filed suit, proposing to represent a class of about 1.2
million recipients of similar offers from GMACM and demanding statutory damages, which
range from $100 to $1,000 per person.”). Murray alleged that the mortgage company’s
offer did not contain “a ‘clear and conspicuous’ notice of the recipient’s right to close her
credit information to all who lacked prior consent,” and that “GMACM had not made the
‘firm offer of credit’ that is essential when a potential lender accesses someone’s credit
history without that person’s consent.” See id. at 951; Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15
U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) (2015) (“A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer
report relating to any consumer . . . in connection with any credit or insurance transaction
that is not initiated by the consumer only if . . . the transaction consists of a firm offer of
credit . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d)(1)(D) (“Any person who uses a consumer
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plaintiffs not to use the statutory damages remedy would make class
actions “impossible.”102 Individual losses are often small or hard to
calculate, so litigating consumer class actions when each plaintiff’s
damages need to be determined to come up with a compensatory
damages amount makes class actions infeasible.103 Finally, the Seventh
Circuit asserted that this is why some statutes, like FCRA, allow
plaintiffs modest damages without the need to prove injury.104
The Ninth Circuit found that Robins was in the same position as
the plaintiff in Beaudry.105 Robins alleged that his statutory rights were
violated and the “interests protected by the statutory rights at issue are
sufficiently concrete and particularized that Congress can elevate
them.”106 The Ninth Circuit drew a comparison to the types of injuries
explicitly mentioned in Lujan as examples of those that can be elevated
by Congress, likening Robins’s personal interest in the handling of his
credit card information to a person’s interest in living in a racially
integrated community.107 In a footnote, the majority noted that
“[b]ecause we determine that Robins has standing by virtue of the
alleged violations of his statutory rights, we do not decide whether harm
to his employment prospects or related anxiety could be sufficient
injuries in fact.”108
C.

The Supreme Court Reverses and Remands
Spokeo petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.109 The

report on any consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction . . . shall
provide . . . a clear and conspicuous statement that . . . the consumer has a right to prohibit
information contained in the consumer’s file . . . from being used in connection with any
credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.”).
102. Murray, 434 F.3d at 952.
103. See id. at 953 (“Common questions no longer would predominate, and an effort to
determine a million consumers’ individual losses would make the suit unmanageable.”).
104. Id.
105. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct.
1540 (2016).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). In Lujan, the
Supreme Court mentions an individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated
community and a company’s interest in marketing its product free from competition as those
which can be elevated by Congress. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
108. Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3.
109. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (“We therefore vacate the
decision below . . . .”).
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Supreme Court’s majority opinion rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning that Congress elevated a statutory right, which includes injury
in fact, to a legally cognizable right as an alternative to the
constitutional minimum for standing.110 For an injury to be
particularized, it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.”111 The majority then noted that an injury in fact must also be
“concrete” and alleged that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider these
two distinct ideas in its standing analysis.112 In the majority’s view, the
Ninth Circuit only considered factors relating to particularization,
making it a constitutionally inadequate standing analysis.113
The majority referred to the two factors for injury elevation the
Ninth Circuit adopted from the Sixth Circuit in Beaudry.114 In the
majority’s view, the two Beaudry factors both applied to
particularization.115 The Supreme Court majority’s opinion talked past
the Ninth Circuit by insisting that it conducted the traditional, threepronged standing test incorrectly.116 Actually, the Ninth Circuit
declined to apply the traditional test at all.117 The majority continued
with a one paragraph explanation of concreteness, pointing to the

110. See id. at 1547–48 (“[I]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise
have standing.”).
111. Id. at 1548.
112. Id. at 1548. The Ninth Circuit would likely agree and with good reason. As
referenced in footnote 3 in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court believed it was unnecessary
to consider Article III standing fully in that case. Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3.
113. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, [the
concreteness] requirement was elided.”); see also Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3 (noting that a
full discussion of the requirements for injury in fact would be legally superfluous).
114. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Robins, 742 F.3d at 413 (adopting the two
factors for statutory right elevation from Beaudry).
115. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Both of these observations concern
particularization, not concreteness.”). But see Robins, 742 F.3d at 413–14 (“[A]lleged
violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
of Article III.”).
116. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Both of these observations concern
particularization, not concreteness.”). But see Robins, 742 F.3d at 413–14 (“[A]lleged
violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
of Article III.”).
117. See Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 n.3 (“Because we determine that Robins has standing
by virtue of the alleged violation of his statutory rights, we do not decide whether harm to
his employment prospects or related anxiety could be sufficient injuries in fact.”). The
Ninth Circuit thought that precedent dictated that there was no need to go through the full
standing test, because of this alternate route created for cases like Beaudry. Id.
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Black’s Law Dictionary definition.118 “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de
facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”119 The majority asserted that
concrete means “real” in the sense that it is not “abstract.”120
The majority agreed that Congress may “elevate to the status of
legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law.121 The majority distinguishes its opinion
from the Ninth Circuit by holding that even in the case of an elevated
statutory violation Article III requires a concrete injury in fact.122 The
majority added that the risk of real harm can satisfy the concreteness
requirement.123 “In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”124
Seemingly out of nowhere, the majority then reached the conclusion
that, in this case, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by
alleging a “bare procedural violation,” because a “violation of one of
FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.”125 For
example, the majority opinion suggested a consumer report containing
only an incorrect zip code would conceivably violate the statute, but it is
difficult to imagine how that alone would work any harm.126
IV. SPOKEO AND PRIOR PRECEDENT
In a concurring opinion in Spokeo, Justice Thomas essentially
endorsed what the Ninth Circuit did, at least with regard to Robins’s
claim that Spokeo did not follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy.127 Justice Thomas would have the Ninth
See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1549 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury
even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
123. See id. (“This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the
requirement of concreteness.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1553–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Warth principle
and noting that one of Robins’ claims “rests on a statutory provision that could arguably
establish a private cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held right); see
also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016) (“[A]lleged violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement of Article III.”).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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Circuit consider whether Robins is trying to enforce a public or
individual right.128 The difference between the majority and concurring
opinions arises out of the majority’s misapplication of Lujan.129
Justice Thomas appreciated the limitations of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lujan.130 The majority opinion used an overbroad
conception of Lujan, ignoring its limited holding that the concreteness
requirement must remain in suits against the government.131 The
plaintiffs in Lujan relied on a statute that authorized anyone to bring a
lawsuit based on the government’s failure to follow a correct
procedure.132 The majority rejected this justification for Article III
standing and viewed the challenge as a case where a private citizen sues
to force the government to act properly.133 The majority affirmed the
idea that “the injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of
‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.’”134 The question, whether this statute creates such a legal
right, is the question the Supreme Court majority should have either

128. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1553–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
Robins can have standing to sue by alleging the invasion of a legal right, if FCRA imposes a
duty upon Spokeo to Robins individually, as opposed to the public).
129. See id. at 1549 (“Robins could not . . . allege a bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”). But see
id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a public right
embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that the violation of that public
right has caused him a concrete, individual harm distinct from the general population.”).
130. See id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the language in Lujan that
limits the holding to suits against the government); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended
beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the government, the concrete injury
requirement must remain.”).
131. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (suggesting that Lujan means a concrete injury
is always necessary in the case of a statutory violation); but see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (“[I]t
is clear that in suits against the Government . . . the concrete injury requirement must
remain.”).
132. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (“The [Circuit Court] held that, because § 7(a)(2)
requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision creates a ‘procedural righ[t]’ to
consultation in all ‘persons’ – so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the
Secretary’s (or presumably any other federal official’s) failure to follow the assertedly
correct . . . procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury
flowing from the failure.”).
133. See id. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an
Article III case or controversy.”).
134. Id. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
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answered or asked the Ninth Circuit to answer.135 The Ninth Circuit did
answer that question in the affirmative.136
Even treating the majority’s application of Lujan and other
precedent as correct,137 it is unclear what the majority wanted Robins to
allege.138 The majority suggests that Robins should have alleged a risk
of harm coming from these statutory violations, but, more than that,
Robins alleged real, existing harm instead.139 The dissent agreed that
the majority overlooked the concrete injury Robins alleged.140 There is
no need to remand the case when, even on an incorrect legal theory,
Robins meets the demands of the majority.141 In addition to the
concerns raised by Justice Ginsburg in the dissent, it is difficult to
discern just what the Court meant by “real.”142 The majority did not
mean that the injury is tangible.143 In fact, the opinion discussed how
intangible harms can still be concrete.144 Congress can make certain
statutory violations into constructive “real” injuries.145 At some level,
the majority opinion in Spokeo recognized that Congress can elevate

135. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1554 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“On remand, the Ninth Circuit can consider the nature of this claim.”).
136. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S.
Ct. 1540 (2016) (“[A]lleged violations of Robins’s statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”).
137. See discussion infra PART IV (arguing that the Spokeo majority opinion misapplied
Lujan.).
138. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“[The Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis] did
not address the question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particular
procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the
concreteness requirement.”).
139. See id. (“[The Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis] did not address the question
framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particular procedural violations alleged in
this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”). But see
id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that Robins alleges the misinformation on
Spokeo’s website is causing imminent and ongoing harm).
140. See id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I therefore see no utility in returning this
case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely:
Spokeo’s misinformation ‘cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.”).
141. See id. (“I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to
underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation
‘cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.’”).
142. See id. at 1548 (“When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to
convey the usual meaning of the term— ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”).
143. See id. at 1549 (“‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with
‘tangible.’”).
144. See id.
145. See id. (discussing Congress’ role in identifying and and elevating intangible
harms).
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intangible harm to constructively meet the concreteness requirement.146
Acknowledging that Congress can do so, yet still requiring an additional
concrete injury, outside of the context of lawsuits against the
government,147 is antithetical to the precedent from various federal
circuits.148
V. SPOKEO BENEFITS CONSUMERS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Spokeo has significant implications for prospective lawsuits
under consumer financial protection statutes.149 To some extent, both
consumer advocacy groups and groups representing the interests of
financial institutions view the Spokeo decision favorably.150 Perhaps
indicating some level of uncertainty over the long-term impact of
Spokeo, both sides of the issue are attempting to spin the decision for
their respective benefits.151 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) has been aggressively submitting amicus briefs that
incorporate Spokeo since it was decided in early 2016.152 The strategy
146.

See id. (discussing Congress’ role in identifying and and elevating intangible

harms).
147. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that the
injury in fact requirement must remain in suits against the government).
148. See Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the FCRA allows for recovery when there are no measurable damages); see
also Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (“That actual loss is
small and hard to quantify is why statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act provide for
modest damages without proof of injury.”).
149. See discussion supra PART IV (arguing that Spokeo makes it more difficult for
consumers to successfully bring class action suits); see also David J. Lender, Greg Silbert,
Eric S. Hochstadt, & Gaspard Curioni, Supreme Court Reiterates Concrete Injury
Requirement in Consumer Class Action Statutory Damages Case, 28 NO. 7 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (July, 2016) (pointing to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act as one
consumer financial protection statute that will be affected).
150. See Lee v. Verizon Comm., Inc., No. 14-10553, 2016 BL 302784, at *2 (5th Cir.,
Sept. 15, 2016) (holding that in light of Spokeo, the conclusion that “a plaintiff’s bare
allegation of incursion on the purported statutory right to ‘proper plan management’ under
ERISA is insufficient to meet the injury-in-fact prong of Article III standing.”); but see
Brief for Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *23,
Fletcher v. Convergex Group, LLC, (No. 16-00734), (arguing that Spokeo comports with
prior holdings that the violation of a statutory right to proper fiduciary conduct is sufficient
for injury-in-fact).
151. See Chris Bruce, Spokeo Test Plaintiff Has Standing, CFPB Says, 106 Banking rep.
(BNA) No. 24. at 885 (June 13, 2016) (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm
sufficient to establish Article III standing.’”).
152. See id. (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm sufficient to establish
Article III standing,’ citing his allegations that Pressler & Pressler misrepresented ‘that an
attorney was meaningfully involved’ in the suit against him.”). In this case, a plaintiff is
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for groups submitting briefs on behalf of consumers seems to be
explicitly referring to the alleged harm as “concrete harm.”153 The
arguments have not changed significantly; rather, the language used by
plaintiffs and their supporters has changed.
In at least one brief, the CFPB focused on the Spokeo majority’s
usage of Akins.154 This case, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,155 was
about a disclosure regarding a finance charge under TILA that
JPMorgan allegedly failed to make.156 In cases where the alleged
statutory violation results from plaintiffs not receiving some
information to which they are entitled, the CFPB argues that Spokeo
supports standing for those plaintiffs.157 In the Keen brief, the CFPB
also argues that the plaintiffs have standing whether or not a finance
charge is actually assessed.158 This is where the CFPB goes furthest to
limit Spokeo’s impact by asserting the Akins principal that no additional
harm needs to be alleged.159
The National Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”) is
recommending that plaintiffs plead actual damages, rather than only
statutory damages, when possible.160 Additionally, as Spokeo is only
suing a law firm under the FDCPA, because the FDCPA gives consumers a legal right to
truthful information in their dealings with debt collectors. Id.
153. See id. (“The CFPB said Bock suffered ‘concrete harm sufficient to establish
Article III standing.’”).
154. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *11, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, (No. 15-17188), (“In
particular, Spokeo specifically reaffirms that plaintiffs in certain cases ‘need not allege any
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified’—-and it identifies Akins and
Public Citizen as cases in which no additional harm was required.”).
155. Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 15-cv-01806-WHO, 2015 WL 6601775 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 30, 2015).
156. See Brief for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at *10, Keen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, (No. 15-17188)
(citing Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1683(a)(3) (2015)) (“TILA grants consumers a
right to receive an accurate disclosure of ‘the finance charge’ associated with their loan.”).
157. See id. at *8 (“[T]he alleged invasion of the Borrowers’ legally protected interest in
receiving information that accurately describes the finance charge that they were legally
obligated to pay is a sufficiently concrete injury-in-fact. And, as Spokeo reaffirms, that
injury is enough by itself to satisfy Article III even if the borrowers did not suffer any
additional injury beyond the deprivation of information . . . .”).
158. Id. at *11.
159. See id. (“Spokeo specifically reaffirms that plaintiffs in certain cases ‘need not
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”).
160. LEGAL TREATISES, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STATUTE-SPECIFIC SPOKEO
ANALYSES EXCERPTED FROM UPDATED NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER LEGAL
TREATISES: STANDING, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/litigation/spokeo/Truth-in-Lending11-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
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binding on federal courts, the NCLC recommends considering bringing
suit in state court where Spokeo is not controlling, but only
persuasive.161 Additionally, the NCLC reads Spokeo narrowly and
suggests that pleading a material risk of real harm may be enough to
have standing under Spokeo.162
At least one district court has limited Spokeo’s impact to apply
only when the statutory violation is extremely unlikely to cause any
actual harm.163 In Larson v. Trans Union, LLC,164 the court asked
whether it was conceivable for the statutory violation complained of to
cause some harm, even just emotional distress.165 This reading of
Spokeo places emphasis on the majority’s point that an incorrect zip
code would be a technical violation of the FCRA.166 In Larson, the
plaintiff alleged that Trans Union provided a credit report with
misleading information; specifically, the credit report did not make it
clear that the plaintiff was not on a terrorist watch list.167 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California decided that
a misleading designation regarding terrorist watch list status that
allegedly caused emotional distress is different from a bare procedural
violation perpetrated by the dissemination of an incorrect zip code.168
The Larson court also asserted that some other districts have limited the
restrictive impact Spokeo has on Article III standing.169

See id.
Id.
See Larson v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668, at *3
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2016) (noting that “the [Supreme Court] ‘expressed no view about any
other types of false information’ and ‘took no position as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s
ultimate conclusion . . . was correct.”).
164. No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2016).
165. See id. (“[I]t is not ‘difficult to imagine how the dissemination of [the OFAC
disclosure] could work [some] concrete harm’ to consumers.”).
166. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (noting that the mere
inaccurate reporting of a zip code is unlikely to work any harm).
167. See Larson, No. 12-CV-05726-WHO, 2016 BL 260668, at *3. In Larson the
plaintiff alleged that Trans Union provided a “misleading” credit report. See id. It was
misleading as to whether the plaintiff was a possible Office of Foreign Asset Control match.
See id.
168. Id.
169. See id. (“[H]is claim is based on the sort of ‘informational’ injury that the Spokeo
court implicitly recognized . . . and that a number of other cases . . . have found sufficient to
support Article III standing.”). The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had standing under
FDCPA when the plaintiff was entitled to receive certain disclosures and the defendant
failed to make them. Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at
*2–3, (11 Cir., July 6, 2016). The Northern District Court in Illinois held that a plaintiff had
161.
162.
163.
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While consumer advocacy groups and some district courts
might want to limit the impact of Spokeo’s holding, it is clear that it
presents a sizable obstacle for consumer litigation, specifically class
actions.170 Financial institutions will surely use Spokeo to challenge
consumer class actions at the early stages of litigation.171 The Spokeo
decision unequivocally deprives consumers of the ability to bring suits
against covered entities while alleging only statutory damages without
additional concrete injury.172 Regardless of what else comes from the
opinion, it is clear that alleging a plain statutory violation is not enough
to establish standing.173 Though the CFPB is trying to emphasize
Spokeo’s mention of Akins, Spokeo’s majority opinion makes it clear
that notwithstanding cases like Akins, “Robins cannot satisfy the
demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation.”174 Since
Article III standing is now more difficult to allege, fewer lawsuits under
consumer financial protection will be initiated.175 In the suits that are
brought, financial institutions will have a more powerful tool at their
disposal: a strengthened case for dismissal for want of standing to
sue.176
Consumer class actions are burdensome to financial institutions,
which are forced to choose between two unfavorable positions: Settle a
suit the financial institution might otherwise win or litigate it and risk
taking a serious loss.177 For example, Bank of America spent $6 billion
standing under FDCPA because the plaintiff established a concrete injury in that the
defendant provided a misleading debt collection notice, which denied the plaintiff the right
to information due to him. Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-CV-10446, 2016
WL 3671467, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill., July 11, 2016).
170. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“[T]he Court reaffirmed well-settled doctrine
against efforts by plaintiffs’ counsel to short-circuit the constitutional standing analysis in
actions dealing with statutorily created rights.”).
171. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146.
172. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
173. See id.
174. Id. at 1550.
175. See NOAH A. LEVINE, DAVID LESSER, JAMIE DYCUS, & FIONA J. KAYE, SUPREME
COURT VACATES NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN SPOKEO, REMANDS FOR ANALYSIS OF
CONCRETE HARMS, WILMERHALE, (2016) (“Spokeo is likely to curtail significantly the
ability of plaintiffs to pursue class actions for mere procedural or other ‘technical’ violations
under such [consumer financial protection statutes].”).
176. See id.
177. Scott S. Partridge & Kerry J. Miller, Some Practical Considerations for Defending
and Settling Products Liability and Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2125, 2162
(June, 2000) (“Plaintiff class action lawyers have always been very creative in seeking to
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in the first quarter of 2014 on litigation, which includes suits that were
settled.178 Bankers admit that high legal bills can obscure the bottom
line when the bank is doing very well.179 In contrast, a reduction in
legal fees can dramatically improve the bottom line: Citigroup’s
expenses decreased by $5 billion in 2014, largely as a result of lower
legal expenses.180 Without the legal expenditures, banks like Bank of
America can transfer profits down to consumers by paying higher
dividends, increasing deposit interest rates, or decreasing interest on
loans, for example.
When financial institutions spend less money defending
consumer lawsuits, their bottom lines, and, consequently, consumers
benefit.181 With the excess capital, those institutions can make new
investments. If those investments return additional capital, banks can
make even more investments. Furthermore, banks can use the capital to
improve their services and branch facilities for consumers. As the
world modernizes, banks would do well to keep pace with regard to
technology and quality of user interface.182 Consumers benefit from
technological improvements that make financial activity more
accessible and more aesthetically interesting. Besides internal investing
to improve the consumer experience, the amount of litigation-related
expenses incurred can affect whether a holding company disburses
dividends to its shareholders and how large those dividends are.183
place consumer products companies in a ‘catch-22’ of ‘settling to survive’ or ‘betting the
company’ by litigating.”).
178. Polly Mosendz, Here’s How Much America’s Biggest Banks Spent on Legal Bills
This Quarter, THE ATLANTIC (April 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/04/heres-how-much-americas-biggest-banks-spent-on-legal-bills-this-quarter/360773/.
179. Id. (quoting Bank of America CEO Bruce Thompson as claiming the bank would
have turned a nice profit without the high legal bills); see Donal Griffin and Dakin
Campbell, U.S. Bank Legal Bills Exceed $100 Billion, BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 28, 2013, 12:02
PM) (“The sum, equivalent to spending $51 million a day, is enough to erase everything the
banks earned in 2012.”).
180. See Christina Rexrode & Peter Rudegeair, Citigroup Profit Soars on Lower
Litigation Costs, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-profitsoars-on-lower-litigation-costs-1437048055 (“Expenses fell 30% to $10.93 billion from
$15.52 billion a year earlier, largely because of smaller legal costs.”).
181. See Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., All Institutions Performance Fourth Quarter 2015, FDIC
QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE (2015) (“Declines in expenses for litigation at a few large
banks . . . lift fourth-quarter income at FDIC-insured institutions. . . .”).
182. Penny Crosman, Why the Retail Store Bank Branch is Making a Comeback, BANK
SYS. & TECH., (Mar. 23, 2011) http://www.banktech.com/channels/why-the-retail-storebank-branch-is-making-a-comeback/d/d-id/1294594?.
183. Cf. Beverly Hirtle, Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases During the

248

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

Holding companies with extra capital due to lower litigation expenses
may pay dividends to their shareholders, which benefits those
consumers. Since Spokeo presents a greater barrier to consumers’
lawsuit prospects, financial institutions can expect a positive impact on
their bottom lines resulting from decreased litigation expenses.184
VI. A NEW, COMMON SENSE TEST FOR STANDING IN STATUTORY
VIOLATION CASES
There is significant disagreement among federal courts
regarding when Congress can elevate statutory violations to the status of
concrete injuries.185 There is disagreement over whether any additional
injury needs to be alleged if Congress satisfactorily elevates a statutory
violation.186 The Supreme Court should seek to provide an answer for
these disagreements as well as solutions for the other problems left
unsolved in Spokeo. Standing doctrine is frequently criticized as
confusing, “manipulable,” and a cover for improper analysis.187 There
is empirical evidence that in cases with substantially similar facts, the
standing doctrine was applied in opposite ways.188 For a doctrine with
such dispositive power, that is unacceptable.
In cases of statutory violations under consumer financial
protection statutes, federal courts should apply a test of basic reason.
The majority opinion in Spokeo focused on the idea that it was possible
to violate the FCRA without working any concrete harm.189 Why is that
relevant to Robins’s case? Robins presented the various inaccuracies
contained in the report.190 Robins then explained why those
inaccuracies made him less attractive to employers while he was
Financial Crisis, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N. Y. STAFF REPORTS NO. 666, at 1 (March 2014)
(supporting the notion that dividends and other capital distributions are inappropriate and
unlikely when capital comes under stress).
184. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“Post-Spokeo companies facing such putative
class actions can be expected to challenge vigorously a named plaintiff’s standing at the
pleading stage.”).
185. See discussion supra PART III.
186. See discussion supra PART III.
187. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008).
188. Id.
189. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (“[N]ot all inaccuracies
cause harm or present any material risk of harm.”).
190. See id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing the inaccuracies including an
inaccurate picture, inaccurate age, income level, education level, etc.).
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actively seeking employment.191 It is unfair to ask Robins to obtain
some kind of proof that an employer chose not to pursue him as a result
of the inaccuracies. It is impractical to look for that kind of
information. A fact-specific test would be a proper replacement for a
test that speculates whether it is possible to violate the statute without
causing harm. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Spokeo
emphasized that it was possible to violate FCRA without doing actual
harm.192 Instead, the new test asks whether the actual facts pled point to
the injury complained of.
It is better for financial institutions and consumers if consumers
cannot sustain lawsuits on bare statutory violations alone.193 Standing
based only on statutory violations opens the door to frivolous
lawsuits.194 The Court should articulate a new test, which amounts to:
Does the story make sense, or more specifically, is the plaintiff alleging
a bare statutory violation? If the answer is yes, does that statutory
violation come paired with a provision for statutory damages? If the
answer is yes, is the plaintiff alleging some harm? If the answer is yes,
does it make sense that this particular statutory violation results in the
harm the plaintiff sustained? This suggested test does not preclude
judicial discretion. It asks the judge to determine if the story is
coherent. It is important to ask the question in the context of the
specific facts alleged by the plaintiff. So, instead of wondering whether
it is possible to violate the statute without working any real harm, like
the Spokeo majority insisted on doing,195 ask if the way the statute was
allegedly violated could harm the plaintiff in the way the plaintiff
alleges.
This test still avoids the pitfalls about which the Spokeo
majority was concerned.196 A plaintiff alleging an incorrect zip code
191. See id. (“As Robins elaborated on brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear
overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers
would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities.”).
192. See id. at 1550 (“A violation of one of FCRA’s procedural requirements may result
in no harm.”).
193. See discussion supra PART V.
194. See Lender, et. al., supra note 146 (“The ruling effectively puts to rest the
contention that the availability of statutory damages from an alleged technical violation is
by itself sufficient to confer standing.”).
195. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“It is difficult to imagine how the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”).
196. See id. (“It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code,
without more, could work any concrete harm.”).
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was reported would not have standing, but Robins clearly would.197
Robins alleged a statutory violation, namely that Spokeo did not use
reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information reported
about Robins. Robins alleged some harm; specifically, he asserted that
the inaccurate reporting may have deprived him of employment
opportunities. Finally, the story, supported by the available facts, is
coherent and reasonable. The employers Robins would be interested in
may not have been interested in him because of misconceptions created
by the inaccurate credit report.
The proposed test does not conflict with anything in Lujan, but
it is better to articulate a clear, bright line than to revert to Lujan.
Lujan’s narrow holding was that in suits against the government, the
concrete injury requirement must remain.198 Lujan reaffirmed the
principle that, outside of suits against the government, “the injury
required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating
rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”199 The proposed test’s
most significant advantage is that it does away with the imprecise
notion of concreteness with which Lujan does not dispense. As an
alternative to the traditional standing test, a federal court should find
that a plaintiff, or class of plaintiffs, has standing if they allege (1) a
statutory violation, (2) that that statutory violation is paired with a civil
liability provision, (3) that they have suffered any harm, and (4) that the
alleged violation caused that harm. This test is consistent with the
principle affirmed in Lujan, that Congress can elevate certain otherwise
insufficient injuries to the status of concrete injuries.200 The test builds
upon Lujan by asking the right questions to determine whether
Congress conveyed standing in the case of any particular plaintiff.
The new test would inject some clarity into a contentious area of
law, even though Robins would have standing under the proposed test.
Consumers benefit from clarity because it allows them to assess

197. See id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the statutory provision Spokeo
allegedly violated, the inaccuracies Spokeo allegedly published, and the harm that allegedly
resulted).
198. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“[I]t is clear that in
suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.”).
199. Id.
200. See id. (“Nothing in this contradicts the principle that ‘[t]he . . . injury required by
Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing.’”

2017]

STANDING AFTER SPOKEO

251

whether bringing a lawsuit is worthwhile. Financial institutions benefit
from clarity, because clarity helps them to conform their behavior to the
law in the course of regular operations. Financial institutions seeking to
avoid lawsuits are better able to do so when they can be sure of what it
takes for a plaintiff to have standing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Standing is a fundamental doctrine; it is a basic constitutional
requirement, emerging from the Constitution’s “cases and
controversies” language, without which a piece of litigation cannot
proceed. Article III standing challenges are a powerful tool for those
litigants who can make use of them. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokeo diminishes the ability of consumers to bring lawsuits under
consumer financial protection statutes by depriving consumers of their
standing when they can only allege bare statutory violations without a
concrete injury. As long as Spokeo governs, financial institutions stand
to benefit.
While this Note contends that the Supreme Court misapplied the
relevant precedent in Spokeo, the Court had the correct policy concerns
in mind. A new, clear test that circumvents discussions of concreteness
in the context of statutory violations would allow federal courts to throw
out frivolous lawsuits while allowing suits where harm from the
statutory violation is difficult to show concretely at the pleading stage.
The clarity benefits both financial institutions and consumers.
Consumers, like Robins, can maintain their suits, while consumers also
benefit indirectly from a reduction in legal fees paid by financial
institutions. Financial institutions benefit primarily through a reduction
in legal fees resulting from fewer frivolous consumer lawsuits. The
proposed test balances the best interests of both consumers and financial
institutions and injects clarity into the crucial, but often misapplied
Article III standing doctrine.
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